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traceptives. Bellotti should not be determinative in the context of contraceptives regulation. The differences between a minor's consideration of abortion
and purchase of contraceptives significantly weaken the effectiveness of a statutory prior parental consultation clause in contraception cases. The recognition
of these differences and the constitutional safeguards that protect a minor's
fundamental right to privacy should defeat renewed legislative efforts to restrict
access to contraceptives.
ELIZABETH E.

HoYT

THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE: CLOSING THE FEDERAL FORUM
Juidicev. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977)
Judgment debtors brought a section 19831 class action in a federal district
court seeking to enjoin enforcement of a New York state court's contempt
proceeding leading to imprisonment. A three-judge district court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the contempt provisions of the New York Judiciary
Law because the provisions did not meet the due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment. 2 The state court judges3 appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, challenging the district court's failure to adhere to
the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris.4 The Supreme Court reversed
the district court decision and HELD, a state's interest in its contempt process,
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970): "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Except for the restrictions of the abstention doctrine, see note 9 infra, §1983 allows a
plaintiff with a claim based on any federal right to have direct access to the federal
courts. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974).
2. The contempt orders were issued when the judgment debtors disobeyed subpoenas
to appear in supplemental procedures brought by their respective creditors in an attempt
to collect default judgments. 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1213 (1977). The alleged constitutional violations included inadequate notice, imposition of punitive fines, and incarceration without
assigned counsel. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 954 (1976). The district court granted
partial summary judgment to the appellees -in an opinion declaring "that Sections 756-757,
770, 772, 773, 774, and 775 of the Judiciary Law of the State of New York are unconstitutional on their face." 97 S. Ct. at 1215 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 17
infra.
3. The judges and the county sheriff had been named as defendants in accordance
with 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), which is directed primarily against incursions by the state
or its officials. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). The district court dismissed
the counts of the complaint that sought damages from the judges for their alleged past
violations of appellees' constitutional rights, and the availability of such relief was not at
issue on appeal. 97 S. Ct. at 1219 n.16. ,,
4. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The district court interpreted Younger abstention to apply "to
civil proceedings only when intervention would disrupt the very interests which would
underlie a state's criminal laws." Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 958 (1976).
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whether that process was labeled civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal, was a
sufficiently important interest to invoke the principle of comity, 5 thereby
precluding federal injunctive relief unless Younger standards were met.6
Federal interference with a state judicial system threatens the peaceful
continuity of the federal form of government based on the concept of dual
sovereignties. 7 To minimize friction between state and federal judiciaries,
Congress and the federal courts have limited the power of the federal judiciary
to intervene in state court proceedings. Congress at an early date enacted the
Anti-Injunction Statute," prohibiting federal courts from enjoining pending
state court proceedings. Meanwhile the federal courts independently developed
a policy of self-restraint known as the abstention doctrine.9
As first enunciated in RailroadCommission v. Pullman Co.1° and expanded
in subsequent decisions, the abstention doctrine demanded that a federal
plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a state statute secure an interpretation of the statute from the highest state court before bringing his claim
in federal court." If while securing the state court statutory interpretation
5. The Court's concept of comity embraces "a proper respect for state functions ...
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways . . . [and] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
6. 97 S. Ct. at 1217, 1218-19.
7. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). See generally C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §52 (2d ed. 1970); Warren, Federal and
State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930).
8. Originally enacted as part of the judiciary Act of 1793, the current statute is 28
U.S.C. §2283 (1970). For a history of §2283 until 1941, see Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118 (1941). See generally Note, The Anti-Injunction Statute: A Damoclean Sword
Blunted, Sharpened, Broken, and . . .1, 22 J. PuB. L. 407 (1973).
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972), held that suits brought under §1983 of the
Civil Rights Acts were not subject to the operation of the Anti-Injunction Statute. For a
discussion of the history of federal intervention in state enforcement of criminal laws, see
Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court,
26 Sw. L.J. 282, 283-335 (1972).
9. The abstention doctrine is supported by four recognized policies: (1) avoidance of
decisions involving sensitive constitutional questions, Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177
(1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941); (2) avoidance of needless
conflict with the states, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1941); (3) allowance of state resolution of unsettled questions of
state law, Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4538 (1977); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); and (4) promotion of judicial efficiency
to ease the crowded federal court dockets, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 433
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Report
on Problems of the Judiciary Before the American Bar Association, in San Francisco (Aug.
14, 1972), reprinted in 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1049 (1972).
10. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
11. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
The state's interpretation may be procured by litigating the action while reserving the
federal questions or by utilizing state certification procedures when available. The certification process, by which the highest state court renders an interpretation of a state statute
on request, is seen by many as an important tool of cooperation between state and federal
courts. See, e.g., Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the
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the plaintiff voluntarily argued his federal claim in state court, the doctrine
of res judicata applied to the federal question, precluding consideration by a
12
federal court except on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
3
The abstention doctrine was somewhat relaxed in Doambrowski v. Pfister.1
The Dombrowski plaintiff argued that bad faith enforcement of a Louisiana
statute regulating subversive activities exerted a chilling effect on his civil
rights activities. The Court reasoned that under those conditions immediate
federal relief under section 1983 was warranted. 4 Noting that in the absence
of a pending state prosecution the federal plaintiff had no alternative forum,
the Court found that a federal declaratory judgment 5 was appropriate because
the affront to the state judiciary and state police power was minimal and
because no duplicative litigation threatened judicial efficiency.
The Dombrowski decision launched a series of decisions enjoining state
criminal proceedings in which constitutional violations were alleged.' 6 Many
lower courts, however, failed to recognize that the Dombrowski Court had
emphasized bad faith application of a state's criminal statute rather than
17
unconstitutionally broad construction of the statute.
In Younger v. Harris'8 the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the
Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV.
413, 433 (1962); Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-90 (1960); McKusick, Certification: A Procedure
for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 U. ME. L. REv. 33, 38-40 (1964). But
see Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMi L. REv. 717, 725-35 (1969).
12. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416, 419 (1964).
Res judicata would preclude a new finding of fact. There are recognized reasons that
plaintiffs may prefer a federal fact finding in claims that involve constitutional issues. For
instance, a plaintiff may wish to avoid the possibility of state court bias or may feel that
the federal court will exhibit greater sympathy and familiarity with his constitutional
claim. Id. at 416. Many commentators have argued that a state hearing with the possibility
of Supreme Court review is an inadequate substitute for federal fact finding. See, e.g.,
Gilbert, Questions Left Unanswered by the February Sextet, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 14, 20;
Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary,
47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 841, 866 (1972); Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in
Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870, 906-07 (1975). These ideas are traceable to the
Marshall Court. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 US. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (Story, J.).
13. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 487.
15. Id. The Dombrowski plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief against prosecution in
the future and a declaratory judgment that the legislation was unconstitutional on its
face. Id. at 482.
16. See, e.g., Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); Machesky v. Bizzell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
See generally Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535 (1970); Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit
as an Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Within, (pts. I &
2), 18 KAN. L. REv. 237, 629 (1970).
17. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 490. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 48 n.4,
50; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 120 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
18. 401 U.S. 37, 48 n.4, 50 (1971). Younger and its five companion cases are often
referred to as the "February Sextet." The other cases are: Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
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permissible scope of federal jurisdiction. A federal district court had enjoined
a state prosecution under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, holding
the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.1 9 The Supreme Court
reversed, declaring that federal abstention was appropriate since the plaintiff
had failed to show bad faith prosecution and since the federal claim could have"
been adjudicated in the pending state prosecution.20 The Court's opinion
shifted emphasis from the threat to individual rights, which had controlled
in Dombrowski, to the importance of the state's interest in enforcing its
criminal laws. The Younger Court determined that absent "extraordinary
circumstances," which would exist only if the statute were incompatible with
any constitutional application 2' or if the plaintiff could prove bad faith and
harassment, 22 principles of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency precluded injunctive relief.2 3 Consequently, the action was dismissed, and
216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
19. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 516 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
20. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 49.
21. The Court's rigid definition of facial invalidity requires that the statute be
flagrantly unconstitutional "in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it." Watson v. Buck, 313
U.S. 387, 402 (1941). The view has been expressed that this exception merely "preserves
an illusion of flexibility in the application of a Younger-type abstention, but it actually
eliminates one of the exceptions from the doctrine." Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W.
4535, 4542 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Under these circumstances "the reasons of policy for deferring to state adjudication are outweighed by the injury flowing from the very bringing of the state proceedings,
by the perversion of the very process that is supposed to provide vindication." Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
23. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44. In a companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66, 73 (1971), the Court held that if a state criminal prosecution is pending against a
federal plaintiff seeking declaratory relief, the same principles applied. But when no state
suit was pending, the Court held in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974), that a
declaratory judgment was appropriate if the plaintiff could demonstrate a genuine threat
of prosecution. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 203, 203 n.5 (1974);
Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief and the Non-pending State Criminal Suit, 34 MD.
L. REV. 87, 113 (1974). See generally Note, Federal Declaratory Relief from Unconstitutional
State Statutes: The Implications of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGsHrs L. REy. 520
(1974).
In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975), the Court greatly limited Steifel by holding
that Younger principles applied with full force to a state case that had been instituted
against a plaintiff following the plaintiff's filing of a complaint requesting federal declaratory relief and before any proceedings of substance on the merits of the federal claim had
begun. The dissent vigorously objected to the new rule as "an open invitation to state
officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction." Id. at 357
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule may discourage plaintiffs from filing suit for fear of
being prosecuted by the state. Note, supra at 534.
The extent to which a federal declaratory judgment binds the state is unclear. Language
characterizing the relief as "persuasive, not coercive" seems to indicate that a declaratory
judgment would not have res judicata effect. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 122 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring). But see McCormack, Developments in the Availability of Federal
Remedies Against State Activities, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (1974); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, supra at 207; Note, supra at 541-59.
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Younger abstention came to be regarded as a denial of federal jurisdiction,
in contrast to Pullman's postponement of jurisdiction pending state deter2
mination of the claim. 4
One of the questions remaining after Younger was whether the abstention
doctrine applied to a state civil proceeding instituted against a section 1983
plaintiff.25 That question was presented in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,2 in
which a theatre owner invoked the first amendment in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an Ohio obscenity-nuisance statute.2 7 Applying the abstention
doctrine, the Supreme Court focused on the quasi-criminal character of the
pending civil action; the state was a party, the offense incorporated the
criminal definition of obscenity, and penal sanctions were available. 28 Exhaustion of state remedies was required because the case did not fall within the
Younger "extraordinary circumstances" and because the potential harm to
It has been suggested that the Court's preference for declaratory relief over injunctive is

"mainly a question of style and grace, not ultimate impact." Wechsler, Federal Courts, State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 740, 841 (1974). But it seems

dear that valid differences exist depending on whether a state action is pending, and the
Court continues to distinguish the two situations. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra
at 207; Note, Implications of the Younger Cases on the Availability of Federal Equitable
Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72 CoLum. L. Rv. 874, 876 (1972); Note,
supra note 12, at 878-81.
24. The Pullman Court remanded the case to the district court "with directions to
retain the bill pending a determination of proceedings, to be brought with reasonable

promptness, in the state court .. " Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 501-02.
Abstention as dismissal rather than retention of jurisdiction was previously articulated in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943). Comment, Abstention: A Case Against
Forum Shutting, 22 J. Pus. L. 439, 440 (1973). However, this form of abstention is now
commonly referred to as Younger abstention. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 1213.
Even the milder Pullman abstention had declined under the Warren Court, which had
shown an increased willingness to respond to the constitutional issues raised by a growing
civil rights movement. With Chief Justice Warren's retirement in 1969, the Court altered
its conception of the scope of federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). Thus the
Burger Court has shifted the balance between state and federal courts with regard to civil
rights, curtailing the availability of the federal courts amidst a deluge of civil rights
claims. See 123 CoNG. R C. S201, S204, S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (statement of Senator
Mathias); Wechsler, supra note 23, at 831; Comment, sura at 444; see generally McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (pts. I & 2), 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 250 (1974).
25. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 55 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations
omitted): "The offense to state interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding. A State's
decision to classify conduct as criminal provides some indication of the importance it has
ascribed to prompt and unencumbered enforcement of its law. By contrast, the State
might not even be a party in a proceeding under a civil suit.
"These considerations would not, to be sure, support any distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings should the ban of 28 U.S.C. §2283, which makes no such distinction, be held unaffected by 42 U.S.C. §1983."
26. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
27. Id. at 598.
28. Id. at 604. When the state brings an action in its parens patriae capacity, it is in
essense an action on behalf of all the residents of the state, indicating a public interest
in the enforcement of the law, whether civil or criminal. When the state is not a party
to a civil proceeding, the statute may provide merely a vehicle for the enforcement of
private rights. Note, supra note 12, at 883.
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the plaintiff was outweighed by the duplication and disruption caused by preappellate interference. 29 Despite Huffman's significant extension of Younger
principles to the civil context, the "criminal nexus" test still restricted broad
application of the expanding abstention doctrine °
The majority opinion in the instant case abandoned Huffman's criminal
nexus test and firmly reiterated the Younger rationale that federal interference would offend state interests whether the proceeding was labeled civil,
criminal, or quasi-criminal. 31 The majority emphasized that the section 1983
plaintiffs "clearly had an opportunity to present their claims in the state
' '3 2
proceeding, and no more is required to invoke Younger abstention.
Protection of the state's contempt power, deemed central to the administration of the state judicial system, was of controlling importance to
the majority. 3 The Court also sought to avoid the implication that federal
interference indicated a negative reflection on the state court's ability to
protect constitutional rights. 3 4 Finally, the Court noted that the federal
plaintiffs not only had failed to present their claims in the state action but
also could have avoided imprisonment altogether merely by making an ap35
pearance in the action when subpoenaed.
Two of the three dissenting Justices attacked the majority's position as a
deliberate usurpation of the congressional power to create the section 1983
remedy.3 6 Arguing that the principles of comity and federalism had been
undercut rather than bolstered by the decision, 37 the dissent accused the
majority of using those principles as "covers for the ultimate goal of denying
the §1983 plaintiffs the federal forum in any case, civil or criminal, when a
pending state proceeding may hear the plaintiff's federal claim." 3 1
The dissent was less concerned with the majority's balancing of interests
under the facts of the instant case than with the impact of the ever-expanding
abstention doctrine on the section 1983 forum. As the dissent suggested, the
legitimate role of the federal courts in protecting individual rights has been
29. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 608.
30. Note, supra note 12, at 8135.
31. 97 S. Ct. at 1213.
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 1217. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4538-39 (1977) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
34. 97 S. Ct. at 1217-18 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1974)).
35. 97 S.Ct. at 1214. See note 2 supra.
36. Id. at 1221 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original):
"It stands the §1983 remedy on its head to deny the §1983 plaintiff access to the federal
forum because of the pendency of state civil proceedings where Congress intended that
the District Court should entertain his suit without regard to the pendency of the state
suit."
Justice Stewart dissented separately on the grounds that the instant case was a proper
case for Pullman abstention. Id. at 1223 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 24 supra.
37. Id. at 1221 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting): "[F]orced federal
abdication in this context undercuts one of the chief values of federalism-the protection
and vindication of important and overriding federal civil rights, which Congress in §1983
and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ordained should be a primary responsibility of the federal
courts." See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
38. 97 S. Ct. at 1222 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
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deemphasized in the name of comity and federalism. Those principles alone
defined the Younger doctrine of abstention, which defies restriction and permits no predictable distinction between any two cases involving a pending
state proceeding.39
The majority could have reached the same result while still retaining
the criminal nexus test. The parallels between a criminal action and the
contempt proceeding in the instant case were obvious: 40 penal sanctions were
imposed, a past act was the basis of the prosecution, 41 state officials were
parties to the action 4 2 and the state's interest in enforcing contempt laws was
arguably as great as in enforcing many criminal laws. Nonetheless, the
majority reasoned that the labels attached to a lawsuit are not a valid basis
for distinguishing cases, that a state's interest in policy as well as procedure
43
demands consideration in a true balancing of interests.
If the majority has left open the question whether Younger applies to all
civil proceedings, 4 some criteria must be developed to determine which of
39. The Younger principles are indeed broad enough to include cases in which the
challenged state action is not part of any court proceeding. There is language in Rizzo v.
Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976), indicating that Younger may be invoked to prevent injunctions
against state and local agency proceedings. Citing the underlying principles of 28 U.S.C. §2283
(1970), the Court held that a district court had no power to interfere with the internal
affairs of a municipal police department if the complaint involved only the officials' failure
to discipline adequately subordinates: "When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a
governmental agency, . . .his case must contend with 'the well-established rule that the
government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the "dispatch of its
own internal affairs ..

"'

"[I'jhe principles of federalism . . .likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is
sought . . .against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local
governments such as respondents here." Id. at 608 (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S.
U.S. 61, 83 (1974)).
It is difficult to reconcile this language with the express provisions and the legislative
history of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). See note 1 supra &cnote 45 infra.
40. Absent was the relation to a criminal statute pointed out in Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. at 604. When such a relation exists, the danger of overbroad extension of
the statute is lessened because the legislature has usually defined the proscribed conduct
with particularity. Note, supra note 12, at 887.
41. A state's interest is clarified when a person has voluntarily transgressed its laws.
Under these circumstances, the Younger doctrine allows the state to further its interests

in restraint and deterrence by enforcing the verdict and the legal penalties attached. Note,
supra note 12, at 888. See generally The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 23, at

209; Comment, supra note 23.
42. In Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4537 (1977), the majority emphasized
that the state department of welfare had instituted the attachment proceeding that was
under constitutional challenge. The dissent agreed with the lower court that the "mere
happenstance" that the state was involved should not control since the same attachment
process was available to private creditors as well. Id. at 4540 (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. 97 S. Ct. at 1217. This rationale was reaffirmed in Trainor v. Hernandez, 45
U.S.L.W. 4535, 4537, 4539 (1977).
44. In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 561 (1972), three Justices expressed
the view that Younger applied equally to state civil proceedings. Cousins v. Wigoda, 409
U.S. 1201, 1206 (1972), inferred that Younger might be extended to all civil proceedings
on grounds of respect for state judiciaries. See Rizzo v. Goode, 97 S. Ct. 598, 608 (1976). In
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a state's legitimate interests are important enough to warrant abstention.4 5
Perhaps a clear test has not been developed because, as the dissent suggested,
the underlying concern of the Court was the deluge of civil rights cases crowding the federal dockets.46

The Court understandably prefers to avoid decision of the sensitive
constitutional issues frequently presented in section 1983 suits. 4 - However,

it was the very sensitivity of those issues that inspired creation of the federal
forum that has now been denied under the abstention doctrine.45 While
Congress has taken the view that state courts are inadequate guarantors of
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has operated on the assumption that
state remedies are adequate. Although the Anti-Injunction Statute has been
expressly declared inapplicable to section 1983 suits,4 9 the Court has con-

sistently applied its own abstention doctrine to render the exception
practically ineffectual. 5
The Court's position, emphasizing judicial etiquette, may prove favorable
to federal policy in the long run. State courts previously irritated by frequent
federal interference may be more anxious to champion federal rights once
they are openly regarded as equals in that role. 51 Nevertheless, the congressional intent to place the federal courts between the state and the section 1983
plaintiff cannot be disregarded, and the discrepancy between legislative and
52
judicial views has not been overlooked by Congress.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535 (1977), the abstention doctrine was applied to
preclude federal injunction of state attachment proceedings described by the dissenters
as a type of "summary extra-judicial process of prejudgment seizure of property." Id. at
4540. However, dissenting opinions in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332. 353 (1975) (Stewart,
J., joined by Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), and the instant case, 97 S. Ct.
at 1222 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting), strenuously objected to the
Court's apparent trend toward extending Younger to all civil cases.
45. The only standard that has emerged is that the state show an important interest
to be vindicated in the state courts. Such an interest includes any policy interest as great
as that of enforcing criminal statutes. Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4539 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 1222. See note 24 supra.
47. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 498.
48. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), the Court recognized that §1983
was passed "to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies."
49. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). For an illuminating discussion of the
Anti-Injunction Statute, see Note, supra note 8.
50. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 608 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
at 43.
51. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. Rv.
591, 680 (1975).
52. Currently, a proposal is before the Senate which, if enacted, would preclude application of the doctrines of abstention and exhaustion of state remedies to §1983 suits. 123
CONG. Rac. S201 (daily ed., Jan. 10, 1977). The Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977
would "insure the continued vitality of 'The Civil Rights Act of 1871,' (42 U.S.C. §1983). ...
In brief, S.35 would:
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Denial of a federal forum seems appropriate when a plaintiff can litigate
his claim and receive an adequate remedy in a pending state action.55 Since
state courts are required to recognize federal rights and are not infrequently
called upon to do so, it does not seem sound in practice or policy to proceed
on the assumption that federal courts are the only legitimate guardians of
constitutional rights.44 The result of such an assumption would be intervention by the federal courts in a greater number of state court proceedings
and a concomitant undermining of state court power and prestige.
To resolve this problem, the abstention doctrine should be applied to
all pending state cases that do not raise fundamental constitutional issues
of national concern. Choosing among .potential federal plaintiffs, a court
should consider the immediacy and severity of the claimed constitutional
violation, the availability of a prompt and fair hearing in a state proceeding,
and any overriding state or federal interest.55 These considerations are traditionally related to the concepts of justiciability, standing, ripeness, 56 and
equity,57 and provide more flexible, intelligible standards for federal courts.58
"Fourth. Provide that the doctrines of abstention and exhaustion of State judicial
remedies are inapplicable in section 1983 suits.

"Fifth. Embody within section 1983, the limited circumstances when a Federal court

can intervene in a pending State. criminal proceeding;
"Sixth. Prescribe the limited circumstances under which the doctrine of res judicata is
applicable in section 1983 suits.
"This legislation amends section 1983 . .. t]o insure that individuals whose rights are
violated under section 1983 are not left without remedies, and, [t]o increase the deterrent
effect of section 1983." Id. at S201-03.
53. At least one Justice holds the view that the Younger rationale "forecloses abstention
in cases in which the federal challenge is to the constitutionality of the proceeding itself... [A]n adequate forum must be one that is sufficiently independent of the alleged
unconstitutional procedure to judge it impartially and to provide prompt relief.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4544 & n.15 (1977).
54. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 611; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
%

460-62 (1974); Whitten, supra note 51, at 680.

55. Most of the legal commentary on the abstention doctrine focuses on proposals
involving balancing tests. See Bezanson, The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial
Power, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1140-50 (1974); Hufstedler, supra note 12, at 867; Maraist,
Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond,
50 TEx. L. Rv. 1324, 1338-46 (1972); Whitten, supra note 51, at 681.

In 1969 the American Law Institute developed a proposal including criteria for abstention, which was not adopted by Congress. While following closely the criteria established
by the Supreme Court in recent cases, the proposal does place greater emphasis on speed
and efficiency, and most importantly it suggests that §1983 cases be declared unaffected by
the abstention doctrine. ALL STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JUISDICTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL CouRTs, §1371(c), (d) (1969).
Commentators have suggested that a true balancing of interests would ignore the
pending-nonpending

distinction except as it

bears on other considerations

such as

availability of state remedy. Hufstedler, supra note 12, at 867; Whitten, supra note 51, at
681.
56.

See Hufstedler, supra note 12, at 867-68; Kennedy & Schoonover, supra note 8, at

284.
57. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43, 50.
58. An alternative remedy involving the establishment of a civil postjudgment pro-
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The proper solution to the overcrowded federal dockets may be the
creation of more federal courts rather than the abolition of federal remedies.
Were the resources available, the federal courts could carefully examine the
costs and benefits of abstention on an ad hoc basis.59 Unless an overriding
federal interest is threatened by unsympathetic adjudication, unreasonable
procedural obstacles, or otherwise inadequate state remedies, state courts
should be allowed to hear and decide federal constitutional claims.
The policies behind the abstention doctrine, avoidance of duplicative
litigation and antagonism between state and federal courts, are undoubtedly
vital to the federal system. The doctrine, however, has been applied with
unnecessary finality. By broadly basing its decisions since Younger on
principles of comity and federalism, the Supreme Court has eliminated
entire classes of litigants from the federal forum and has eroded the balancing
process that should require an ad hoc consideration of competing interests.
GLEE
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vision similar to the writ of habeas corpus has been suggested. Note, supra note 12, at 921.
This remedy would exempt civil rights actions from the doctrine of res judicata, allowing
federal fact finding despite a state court's prior determination. The social interest in civil
rights seems analogous to the social interest in individual liberty that justifies the writ
of habeas corpus, see McCormack, supra note 24, at 259, and the affront to a state's interest
might be lessened under such an alternative because the state would have the first opportunity to dispose of the claim. Such a remedy would not, however, promote judicial
efficiency, especially if federal plaintiffs were required to exhaust state remedies through
appellate procedures before requesting a new finding of fact in the federal forum.
Moreover, the expense and delay of such a procedure might unjustly burden and discourage the federal plaintiff, who meanwhile must bear the state's infringement.
59. The costs of abstention in a particular case would include the burdensome expense
and delay to a federal plaintiff seeking relief, the potential detriment to federal rights,
the erosion of the right to a federal forum, and the undermining of public confidence
in the ability of the federal courts to exercise their basic powers. Benefits that often
follow from abstention are avoidance of friction between state and federal judiciaries and
between the two sovereign governments, conservation of judicial time, avoidance of premature decisions of constitutional issues, and increased strength and prestige for state
courts. Hufstedler, supra note 12, at 867-70.
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